Desenrola Brasil: investigation into an active campaign
Five available hostnames, CPF lookup, simulated assistance and a request for R$ 68.92 via PIX: the chain documented in the code.
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cyberthreatintelligence.lat · EDITORIAL RESEARCH
Cyber Threat Intelligence LATAM investigates digital financial fraud in Latin America: malware, BEC, PhaaS, ransomware, MitM, AiTM, voice and video deepfakes, KYC fraud and behavioral biometrics. We rely on our own dataset, hand-curated and analyzed with data science, and on field investigations with verifiable references. We always distinguish between what is documented and what actually circulates.
Independent research on digital financial fraud in Latin America. Reports and analysis with verifiable sources, ready to read and consult.
Open research
Cyber Threat Intelligence LATAM shows how it builds a regional reading before asking for trust: technical sources, public alerts and visible limits. The summary lets you review the criteria; the full report is delivered on request.
A 2026 finding, step by step: what is recorded, what it is cross-checked against and what is left unclaimed.
CrowdStrike, Threat Hunting Report 2026: in late March 2026, OverWatch observed SLIM SPIDER, a Brazil-based eCrime group, in a multi-stage intrusion at a Brazilian financial institution, aimed at its crypto assets and instant-payment accounts. Credentials were obtained with Bash scripts that queried the cloud metadata service, and the exposed panel showed compromised hosts from several Brazilian banks and fintechs. Source, date and what it claims are recorded; the report does not describe how initial access was gained.
BioCatch (2026) describes another blind spot in the region: the account that receives the money is among the least analysed in prevention models. Darktrace (2026) documents Water Saci, another Brazilian group, which uses WhatsApp against financial institutions and crypto exchanges. These are different angles: neither confirms the CrowdStrike case on its own.
It is stated that CrowdStrike observed this intrusion in March 2026 and that it targeted crypto assets and instant-payment accounts. It is not stated how much money was taken, how many institutions suffered losses, how initial access was gained, or that the same group is behind other incidents: there is a single source.
The same finding as above, step by step: what is recorded, what it is cross-checked against and what is left unclaimed.
INTERPOL, 18 March 2024: five administrators arrested in Brazil in January 2024. Source, date and what it claims are recorded: arrests, not the end of the operation.
Kaspersky (October 2024), IBM X-Force and ESET (June 2025) document later activity: three vendors, three different sets of telemetry.
It is stated that there was activity after the operation. It is not stated how many victims there are or in which country it weighs most.
Where published sources exist by country — and where the map is still blank.
Explore the map ↗LATAM Atlas families, filterable by platform and country. Dataset counts, not prevalence.
Open the explorer ↗Free reading of the study. The full report is delivered on request.
Read the report ↗Banks, CERTs and fraud teams: context, collaboration or access to the material.
Write ↗Blog in motion
Each card opens a public read from the blog: techniques, campaigns, limits and questions that remain open in the regional financial ecosystem.
Blog
Five available hostnames, CPF lookup, simulated assistance and a request for R$ 68.92 via PIX: the chain documented in the code.
An investigation into Omegatech: Seychelles, malware, abuse notices, infrastructure reputation and four documented chains connected to TALE-VAULT.
An offer aimed at Germany that uses an Argentine reference leads to the TALE-VAULT infrastructure: nine brands sharing the same template and 3,622 domains observed between September 6 and October 6, 2026. The note separates what is documented from what the evidence does not support.
Over two days of normal phone use I documented paid ads, with the advertiser identity verified by Google, that led to fake news articles, investment chatbots, phone-number capture and a form asking for the full card. It is not a gang: it is a traffic-acquisition circuit.
AiTM can capture credentials and also the authenticated session. This note separates OTPs, session cookies and interactive phishing; regional conclusions are limited to the sources reviewed.
CTI-LATAM-2026-001 · TLP:CLEAR
Verified ads, destinations that do not match.
Paid ads with the advertiser identity verified by Google led Argentine users to fake investment articles, chatbots carrying the Mercado Libre brand and a form that asks for the full card with its security code. It is not a gang: it is a traffic market.