It is not prevalence
The counts are the dataset's as of the data date. They are not a risk ranking by country or by family.
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Own dataset · data as of 2026-09-29
Which financial malware families the sources document in each country. Every data point links to a verifiable reference; the counts describe the dataset, not real prevalence.
Families by platform
Android 31
AntidotAnubisBeatBankerBrasDexBRATACopybaraDevilNFCGhimobGigabudGoatRATGodfatherHerodotusHookHydraK99 Triumph CityMedusaNFCMultiPayNFU PayNGatePixBankBotPixPiratePixRevolutionPixStealerPromptSpyRocinanteSpyLoanSpyNoteToxicPandaTsarBotXenomorphZanubis
Windows and PoS/ATM 28
AmavaldoBanana RATBBTokBizarroBlind EagleCasbaneiroChavecloakCoyoteGoPixGrandoreiroGuildmaJanelaRATJaneleiroJavaliKREMLINLampionMekotioMispaduNFe-RATNumandoOkoBotPrilexSCMBANKERStarland RATTCLBANKERVadokristVenonWater Saci
PhaaS 8
Balonx SistemaDarculaGitBaitKit BDV multibancoLucidPhoenix SystemShadowParasiteVX-Pack
Alerts from public bodies
Families per country
18 territories with no families in the dataset
ATT&CK techniques used by the families
53 of 67 families have a profile with techniques · data as of 2026-09-29
T1417.002Input Capture: GUI Input Capture15T1516Input Injection12T1660Phishing10T1566Phishing9T1417Input Capture8T1102Web Service7T1219Remote Access Software6T1513Screen Capture6T1056Input Capture5T1418Software Discovery4T1636.004Protected User Data: SMS Messages4T1105Ingress Tool Transfer3T1115Clipboard Data3T1189Drive-by Compromise3T1406Obfuscated Files or Information3T1437.001Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols3T1566.001Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment3T1574.002Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading3T1027Obfuscated Files or Information2T1027.001Obfuscated Files or Information: Binary Padding2T1036Masquerading2T1059.001Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell2T1059.005Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic2T1071Application Layer Protocol2T1185Browser Session Hijacking2T1204.002User Execution: Malicious File2T1218System Binary Proxy Execution2T1417.001Input Capture: Keylogging2T1430Location Tracking2T1534Internal Spearphishing2T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys2T1566.002Phishing: Spearphishing Link2T1568.002Dynamic Resolution: Domain Generation Algorithms2T1614.001System Location Discovery2T1633Virtualization2T1636.003Protected User Data: Contact List2T1053.005Scheduled Task1T1055Process Injection1T1056.001Input Capture: Keylogging1T1082System Information Discovery1T1110Brute Force1T1113Screen Capture1T1114.001Email Collection: Local Email Collection1T1200Hardware Additions1T1218.007System Binary Proxy Execution: Msiexec1T1426System Information Discovery1T1476Deliver Malicious App1T1496Resource Hijacking1T1497Virtualization1T1497.001Virtualization1T1499Endpoint DoS1T1550Use Alternate Authentication Material1T1555Credentials from Password Stores1T1555.003Credentials from Web Browsers1T1557Adversary-in-the-Middle1T1564Hide Artifacts1T1567Exfiltration Over Web Service1T1598Phishing for Information1T1625Hijack Execution Flow1T1629.002Impair Defenses1T1630Account Access Removal1T1636.001Protected User Data: Calendar Entries1T1636.002Protected User Data: Call Logs1T1646Exfiltration Over C2 Channel1* Descriptive analysis with data as of 15 September: 64 distinct techniques and 171 family–technique pairs.
Dataset figures as of the data date. They are not field prevalence, a risk ranking or a volume of observed incidents.
Mobile banking trojans, overlays, NFC relay and Pix stealers.
Documented families · 31
AntidotAnubisBeatBankerBrasDexBRATACopybaraDevilNFCGhimobGigabudGoatRATGodfatherHerodotusHookHydraK99 Triumph CityMedusaNFCMultiPayNFU PayNGatePixBankBotPixPiratePixRevolutionPixStealerPromptSpyRocinanteSpyLoanSpyNoteToxicPandaTsarBotXenomorphZanubis
Countries with most families
A count of what is documented, not prevalence.
See these 31 in the explorer →Desktop banking trojans, toolkits and point-of-sale malware.
Documented families · 28
AmavaldoBanana RATBBTokBizarroBlind EagleCasbaneiroChavecloakCoyoteGoPixGrandoreiroGuildmaJanelaRATJaneleiroJavaliKREMLINLampionMekotioMispaduNFe-RATNumandoOkoBotPrilexSCMBANKERStarland RATTCLBANKERVadokristVenonWater Saci
Countries with most families
A count of what is documented, not prevalence.
See these 28 in the explorer →Phishing-as-a-service, smishing/RCS and AiTM infrastructure.
Documented families · 8
Balonx SistemaDarculaGitBaitKit BDV multibancoLucidPhoenix SystemShadowParasiteVX-Pack
Countries with most families
A count of what is documented, not prevalence.
See these 8 in the explorer →Institutional alerts; they are not malware families.
Alerts from public bodies
This map starts from an own dataset, curated by hand for Latin America and the Caribbean, with verifiable references. It measures what is documented; it does not measure how much malware there is in the region.
The counts are the dataset's as of the data date. They are not a risk ranking by country or by family.
Countries without evidence are marked as coverage gaps, not as clean territory.
A country cited in the sources does not imply there are victims there. And the size of a count depends on the available literature: Brazil concentrates most of the public documentation.
Alerts from CERTs and regulators anchor the institutional voice; they measure neither volume nor coverage.
Select a country to see the documented families. The color shows how many families mention the country in their sources, not how much activity there is.
The full map as text: countries with documented families and those with institutional alerts only.
PixPirate BrasDex PixBankBot PixStealer Ghimob GoatRAT Herodotus NGate NFCMultiPay PixRevolution Gigabud K99 Triumph City NFU Pay Mekotio Casbaneiro Guildma Javali Mispadu Numando Amavaldo Vadokrist Janeleiro Coyote Prilex Lampion BBTok JanelaRAT Chavecloak TCLBANKER NFe-RAT Water Saci Venon KREMLIN OkoBot Banana RAT VX-Pack
Gigabud Grandoreiro Mekotio Casbaneiro Mispadu Numando Amavaldo BBTok JanelaRAT SCMBANKER OkoBot Balonx Sistema GitBait Kit BDV multibanco
Ghimob Zanubis ToxicPanda K99 Triumph City Mekotio Casbaneiro Kit BDV multibanco
Gigabud K99 Triumph City Casbaneiro Blind Eagle Kit BDV multibanco ShadowParasite
PromptSpy Casbaneiro Bizarro Blind Eagle
Mekotio Bizarro
Starland RAT Kit BDV multibanco
Ghimob
Kit BDV multibanco
No documented families in the dataset.
No documented families in the dataset.
Latin American and Caribbean countries with no documented evidence so far: they are not "clean territory"; they are gaps in the available sources. They are under investigation.
BahamasBelizeBoliviaCubaEcuadorEl SalvadorGuatemalaGuyanaHaitiHondurasNicaraguaPanamaPuerto RicoSurinameTrinidad and TobagoUruguay
The dataset is organized into Android, Windows and PoS, PhaaS and institutional alerts. Each front has an extended read on the blog.
Mobile banking trojans, overlays, NFC relay and Pix stealers. Includes Zanubis, Medusa, NGate, Copybara and Herodotus.
Read: overlays and Pix →Desktop trojans, toolkits and point-of-sale malware: Grandoreiro, Guildma, TCLBANKER, Prilex and Bizarro.
Read: Grandoreiro, Mekotio and Tetrade →Phishing-as-a-service platforms and kits: Balonx Sistema, GitBait, Lucid and Darcula.
See the report →Alerts from public bodies: CSIRT Chile/ANCI, CNSD Peru, Dominican Republic Superintendency of Banks and JaCIRT Jamaica.
See the coverage gaps →Three years of financial threats in Latin America. The four-page report is free to read; the full study is delivered on institutional request.
This publication follows how threats against banks, fintechs and financial users in Latin America are evolving and what changes for those who decide: regional patterns, the limits of the evidence and scenarios. The blog gathers source-dated analyses; there is also an RSS feed and the author's professional profile on LinkedIn.
How to read this dataset and this map.
It is independent strategic financial threat intelligence for Latin America: banking malware, PhaaS and fraud, with verifiable sources and a named author. It shows what changes in the ecosystem for those who make decisions; it is not a monitoring service or a live feed.
Ezequiel Jorge La Terra, the responsible author. The profile, the scope of the role and what the byline does not guarantee are on the author page.
No. It is a curated dataset. The counts describe what the sources document with data as of 2026-09-29; absence from the dataset ≠ absence of threat.
That at least one family in the dataset mentions that country in the cited sources. The more families mention it, the more intense the color. It measures neither victims nor activity. Countries with no color are coverage gaps.
Because the available verifiable sources do not document them so far. It is a coverage gap, not a sign of safety, and those countries are under investigation.
The report page has the free-to-read PDF report; the full study is requested from that same page. Enquiries and collaboration go through the contact page or by email to contacto@cyberthreatintelligence.lat.
Find the context, sources and limits of these threats in the reports and articles on this site. For complementary reading, see the CASHCLOAK LATAM field investigation, with its own scope and observation period.